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ABSTRACT
The general housing policy trend in Europe has been towards
neoliberalization meaning less state involvement in housing mar-
ket and less government support for housing production.
However, private rental markets are still regulated in many
European countries. Here, we classify 33 European countries
based on rent regulation system and welfare state regime. There
seems to be some but not too much correspondence between
the welfare state regime and whether rents are controlled.
However, it seems that the role of rent regulation depends on
the context and one should take a closer look at specific cases.
We look at Nordic welfare states that are similar in that all repre-
sent the social democratic welfare model but different in their
housing regimes by which we mean the basic principles of how
housing provision in the country is organized.
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Housing researchers are quite unanimous about a general neoliberal trend in
European housing policies (e.g. Bengtsson et al 2013; Aalbers 2015; Dewilde & De
Decker 2016; Clapham 2019). Governments are withdrawing from large scale inter-
vention in the workings of the housing markets, financial support for housing pro-
duction is cut to very little or nothing, support for housing consumption is targeted
only to those most in need, and housing markets are deregulated – also in the coun-
tries that have been thought to have de-commodified housing the most (see Clark &
Johnson 2009; Christophers 2013). How this trend has affected the regulation of pri-
vate rental markets (PRM), a policy that seems to be quite out of tune of the present
trends in public policy? Rent control was a common policy in Europe during the first
half of 20th century and especially during wartime crises. After that there has been
great variation in the use of this policy instrument. Some countries wanted to get rid
of rent control as soon as possible (e.g. Finland), sometimes taking it up again later
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temporarily or in milder versions (e.g. Ireland), in other countries (e.g. Sweden) regu-
lation of rents became more persistent feature of the housing system.
This paper attempts to answer three questions. The first question is in what ways
European countries practice regulation of rents today? Assuming the general trend
towards free markets we could expect that regulation of rents would be disappearing
as a policy. We will see that there is quite a lot of variation in this respect between
European societies. Perhaps practicing regulation of rents is linked to the way how
welfare is provided in a country. Therefore, our second question is: to what extent
there is an association between a country belonging to a distinct type of welfare
regime and its rent regulation policy? As we know that housing does not play a par-
ticularly central role in welfare regime theory, we might employ a regime concept
that is more specifically targeted to housing. The third question of this paper is: can
the type of a country’s housing regime account for its rent regulation policy?
This paper is a policy review drawing on information about rent regulation in
European housing policy systems from mainly secondary sources. The information
on individual countries has been retrieved from TENLAWproject’s country reports
and various other published sources (research articles, government documents, etc.).
We have defined rent regulation as a type of tenure legislation that states limitations
to rent setting and rent increases by private (i.e. for-profit) landlords. We have classi-
fied 33 European countries and the ‘hardness’ of their rent regulation system based
on the idea of generations of rent control. Countries that regulate rents or rent
increases have been classified as having a second- or third-generation rent regulation
system. Countries with no rent regulation have been classified as having free ren-
tal markets.
Regulation of Rents1 as Housing Policy
Housing differs from other market commodities in the sense that it is a necessity,
and it requires most households to spend a considerable amount of their income
(Arnott 2015). Housing policies often aim to provide everybody good quality housing
at a reasonable price. How this goal is pursued varies between countries, but it usu-
ally requires the state to take a hand in the housing market. According to Doling
(1997) the state has six options to intervene in the housing market: non-action,
exhortation, regulation, taxation, subsidy and provision. In practice these options are
often implemented in various combinations that interplay with each other. For
example, the introduction of housing allowances can affect rent regulation systems
(Turner & Elsinga 2005). Both housing market and housing policy are based on ten-
ures. The most widespread tenure forms are owner-occupation, social rentals and pri-
vate rentals, but tenure forms have different social connotations depending on the
socio-economic context (Haffner et al. 2018). The state may structure markets in dif-
ferent ways, and the consequence of the varying decisions taken by national govern-
ments is that housing markets differ in their structures and their consequent
outcomes between countries and over time (Clapham 2019). In this paper we exam-
ine these variations in rent regulation and their association with types of welfare
regimes in European context and housing regimes in Nordic context. Our approach
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can be described as social constructionism as we emphasize the significance of social,
political and economic context in researching housing policy (Jacobs et al. 2004).
Haffner et al. (2018) distinguish between social and private rental sector based on
landlord type, allocation and subsidies. In private rental sector (PRS) landlords are
typically institutions or private persons, housing is allocated based on the market and
there are typically no subsidies. Still, private renting has a legal structure that deter-
mines the duties and responsibilities of landlords and tenants. Common areas of
regulation include the length of tenancies, rent levels and the security of renters. In
countries with strong regulation, there is a framework of national law that seeks to
define responsibilities and protect the tenant as it is assumed that there is a power
imbalance between the two parties. In countries, where there is not much regulation,
the contract between the landlord and tenant is very important (Clapham 2019).
Regulation of PRM can take many forms, but in this paper, we are mainly inter-
ested in the regulation of rents. Rent regulation means that the rents of rental dwell-
ings are somehow restricted. Rent regulation empowers a democratically accountable
government body to regulate prices of rental housing in a specific jurisdiction (cf.
Zimmer 2017). Rent regulation can be done by regulating either the level of rents or
rent increases or combining both (Turner & Malpezzi 2003). Arnott (1995, 2003)
classifies rent regulation in three generations of rent control. First- generation rent
control means ‘hard’ control in which rents are frozen at a certain level. Second- gen-
eration rent control is more ‘soft’ regulation in which a set of regulations govern
rents and rent increases, but usually a ‘reasonable’ rate of return is ensured to land-
lords. There is more flexibility in the design of a second-generation rent control pack-
age than in the design of a first-generation rent control package (ibid., Lind 2001). In
third-generation rent control system rent increases are controlled within a tenancy
but are unrestricted between tenancies. This classification of rent control generations
is used here to make distinctions between different types of rent regulation and to
underline the development of rent regulation systems into a more market-oriented
course. We will show in this paper, where European countries lie at present in terms
of the generations of rent control and in relation to welfare state regimes. We will
also demonstrate later in more detail, how housing regimes have affected the evolu-
tion of rent regulation in Nordic context.
First-generation rent control started as wartime rent freezes during the World
Wars in Europe and continued long after the Second World War had ended. The era
of second-generation rent control started in Western Europe in the 1970s when
milder regulation measures were introduced in many European jurisdictions. (Haffner
et al. 2012, Arnott 1995 & 2003). In Eastern Europe the history of private renting
was quite different under the socialist regime where housing was more or less state
controlled and private renting existed as a ‘crack’ in the system, typically in the form
of forced private renting or subletting (Heged€us & Puzanov 2018). Since then, rent
regulation systems in Europe have continued to evolve in correspondence with eco-
nomic and political turns. There has been a move towards third-generation rent con-
trol (Arnott 2003) and deregulation of PRM. Rent regulation is usually employed to
protect what is considered as the weaker party of the tenancy agreement, the tenant.
Rent regulation can be described as balancing between the interests of tenants and
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the interests of landlords2. The landlord-tenant relationship is inherently unequal as
the landlord has the discretionary power to withhold access to a good that is central
to a tenant’s wellbeing (housing) (Zimmer 2017), and therefore rent regulation might
be introduced to protect the tenant from this power asymmetry. But if the regulation
is too strong, landlords may exit the market in the long run (Haffner et al. 2008).
According to Jenkins (2009), the general view among economists is that rent regu-
lation has many negative and market-distorting side effects such as misallocation,
rental housing shortage and under maintenance (see also Arnott 1995 & 2003). This
is the case especially concerning first-generation rent controls that no longer exist in
Europe (as is demonstrated later in this paper). Despite these critical views, rent regu-
lation has persisted and it still has advocates. Haffner et al. (2012) offer rationales for
rent regulation based on welfare economics: housing market inefficiency, uneven
income distribution or social segregation might justify rent regulation policy if disad-
vantages for tenants take centre stage in housing policy. Clapham (2019) argues that
the effectiveness of housing policies should be judged based on how they impact
‘dwellers’, those who are or could be housed. Therefore, ‘a good housing policy is
one that improves individual and collective well-being through increasing the affor-
dances that dwellers achieve from their housing’ (ibid. p. 23). On the other hand,
empirical research in Europe has shown that the impacts of rent regulation vary
greatly between countries and regions and are therefore specific to housing market
situations (Arnott 1995; Haffner et al. 2012; Turner & Malpezzi 2003). Whitehead
et al. (2012)3 found no clear link between the level of regulation and the size of the
PRS in European countries.
Even when intended as temporary, rent regulation programmes seem to hold on
(Arnott 2003). The contemporary PRM reflect specific regional and national tradi-
tions, laws, housing policies, practices and power relations (Haffner et al. 2018).
Maintaining the system can be an active choice or a result of non-decision-making
(Kettunen 2018).
Is Rent Regulation Disappearing in Europe?
In the beginning, we posed the question of what ways European countries practice
rent regulation today. Table 1 summarizes our analysis of tenancy laws in 33
European countries in alphabetical order. It is based on material retrieved from pro-
ject TENLAW’s national reports and previous research on rent regulation and ten-
ancy laws. We analyzed the material to investigate if there is legislation on rent
regulation in a country and how it is targeted in terms of rents and rent increases.
We defined rent regulation as any type of tenancy legislation that states limitations to
rent setting and/or rent increases in rental contracts in the PRS, namely rental sector
with private landlords and market based allocation. We aimed at making the classifi-
cation as clear as possible, so even countries with very mild – almost market oriented
– regulation were classified as having a rent regulation system. Rents or rent increases
tied to an index were classified as rent regulation, as well as regulation limited to cer-
tain areas or parts of the housing stock.
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Table 1. Regulation of rents in 33 European countries.
















Belgium YES Rent increases Third generation 23%
Bulgaria NO – – 1,7%
Croatia YES, in open-ended
rental contracts









Czech Republic NO – – 17,6%
Denmark YES, multiple types of
regulation
depending on the





England NO, except contracts
dated before 1989
– – 18%
Estonia NO – – 7,3%
Finland NO – – 16%












Greece NO – – 19,8%
Hungary NO – – 8%
Iceland NO – – 11,1%4
Ireland YES, special restrictions
on rent
pressure zones
Initial rents and rent
increases tied to
market level or






Italy NO – – 16,3%
Latvia NO – – 14,7%
Lithuania NO – – 9%
Luxemburg YES, part of
private housing
Rent increases (fixed for
3 years)
Third generation 27,7%
Malta NO – – 14,6%
The Netherlands YES, excl. small amount
of housing with high
quality points




Norway YES Rent increases Third generation 22,8%
Poland YES Rent increases Third generation 4%
Portugal NO, except contracts
dated before 1990
– – 18%
Romania NO – – 4,2%














There were no countries with rent freezes typical to first-generation rent control.
The distinction between second- and third-generation rent control was made based
on how the regulation was targeted. If both initial rents and rent increases were regu-
lated, it was classified as second-generation rent control. If only rent increases were
regulated, it was classified as third-generation rent control. The distinction between
second- and third-generation rent control was not clear-cut in all cases. There are
some countries that have legislation where rent regulation depends on e.g. the age or
location of the premises or the year that the rental contract is conducted. (There
might also be other national and local exceptions that we were not able to retrieve
from the material.) Regarding these cases, we determined the generation of rent con-
trol based on the restrictiveness of current legislation: if initial rents are regulated
even in parts of the housing stock, it is classified as second-generation rent control.
In some countries, old strict laws are still applied to rental contracts dated before the
1990s, but this legislation was excluded from the classification. However, this shows
the stickiness of rent regulation in some cases. The share of private rental housing in
each country is included in Table 1, but we have no data on the coverage of regula-
tory measures (i.e. how many households are affected).
There are several interesting points to be made about the information in Table 1. At
present, there is still a considerable amount of rent regulation in Europe, though in most
countries, altogether 17, a free market reigns in PRM. There are ten countries with
third-generation rent control system and six countries with second-generation rent con-
trol system. The generations typology is used to describe the ‘hardness’ of the control
system, as third-generation rent control is usually a lighter form of regulation than
second-generation rent control. However, in practice both second-generation measures
and third-generation measures (as defined in this paper) consist of restrictions of differ-
ent scale. Figure 1 displays the countries on a map. As we are analyzing policies rather
than outcomes, the restrictiveness of certain rent regulation system (in practice) is out-
side the scope of this paper. If we look at the share of private rental housing, we see that
there is great variation. This variation is not consistent with the generation of rent con-
trol. In countries with second-generation rent control, the share of PRS is between 8 per-
cent and 41 percent. In countries with third-generation rent control and free market
Table 1. Continued.









Serbia NO – – 5%
Slovakia NO – – 2,6%
Slovenia NO – – 3%
Spain YES, depending the
date of the contract
Rent increases for the
first 3 to 5 years
Third generation 10,1%







Switzerland YES Rent increases Third generation 52%
Source: TENLAW National Reports; Whitehead et al 2012; Bengtsson et al. 2013; The Ministry of Welfare in
Iceland 1994.
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renting the numbers are 2,9 percent to 52 percent and 1,7 percent to 19,8 percent,
respectively (to see an overview of the share of different tenures, see appendix 1).
All the 33 countries listed above have had some type of rent regulation systems at
some point in their past (Whitehead et al. 2012; Van der Heijden & Haffner 2000;
Haffner et al. 2008; Baldini & Poggio 2012; Crook & Kemp 2014; TENLAW National
reports 2017). Coming to this day, some of them have stayed in the path of rent
regulation, albeit adjusting the system along the way, and some have decided to free
PRM from rent regulation. As we know that housing policies evolve in interplay with
general economic and social processes along with national political forces and demo-
graphic and economic factors (Haffner et al. 2018), we come across with the idea pre-
sented in the beginning of the paper: could practicing regulation of rents be linked to
the way how welfare is provided in a country?
Figure 1. Rent regulation in 33 European countries.
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Type of Welfare Regime and Rent Regulation
Housing policy is part of the welfare state, albeit a peculiar one. Housing researchers
know that housing does not fit in well with the other pillars of welfare, pensions,
education, health care and social aid, due to its ambiguous place between the market
and the state (see e.g. Torgersen 1987; Kemeny 2001). Practically everywhere the mar-
ket actors take care of the production and a part of the distribution of housing at the
same time as the state carries the final responsibility for housing of the population.
Welfare state policies have been successfully analyzed with welfare state typologies
that group countries with similar policies into distinct welfare regimes. The most
famous of these is the three worlds of welfare capitalism model developed by Gøsta
Esping-Andersen (1990). The welfare regime approach has interested housing
researchers quite a lot, even though housing is not central in the original theory
(Doling 1999; Fahey & Norris 2011; Hoekstra 2003; Kemeny 2001; Matznetter &
Mundt 2012; Stamsø 2010; van Gent 2010; Zhou & Ronald 2017).
Esping-Andersen’s original welfare state typology distinguishes three types of wel-
fare state regimes based on three interrelated criteria: de-commodification, stratifica-
tion and the arrangements between the state, market and family. Esping-Andersen’s
regime types are social democratic, corporatist and liberal welfare state (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Subsequent research has added South European welfare state model
to this list (e.g. Allen 2006; Ferrera 1996; Rhodes 1996), as well as a post-socialist wel-
fare model (see, e.g. Aidukaite 2004; Stephens et al. 2015; Stunding 1996).Table 2
Table 2. Regulation of the private rental market in Europe according to generation of
rent control.
Second generation Third generation Free markets



































Source: TENLAW national reports: http://www.tenlaw.uni-bremen.de (accessed 30 March 2017); Whitehead et al
2012; Bengtsson et al 2013.
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groups 33 European countries according to these five welfare state regime types. The
countries within the same regime type allegedly have similar principles concerning
the provision of welfare, as well as a same kind of historical development in the field
of welfare. Therefore, it can hypothetically be expected that their housing policies
would also be similar. Thus, we are interested in looking at the countries under the
same welfare state regime to see if they have similar rent regulation policies.
According to Clapham (2019, p. 51), when it come s to private renting, liberal hous-
ing regimes seem to give priority to owner-occupation rather than private renting
and social-democratic regimes seem to give priority to public rather than private
renting. Only in corporatist regimes regulated private rented sector seems to flourish.
In all the countries belonging to the corporatist welfare regime, there is a system
of rent regulation. The systems are mostly classified as third-generation rent control,
but there are also second-generation systems. Some of these countries, like Germany
and Switzerland, have a large PRS whereas in others the sector is rather small, like in
the Netherlands, where the rental housing sector is exceptionally large, but it is domi-
nated by rental housing by private non-profit corporations, not classified as private
renting. In Jim Kemeny’s typology of rental housing systems, most of these countries
belong to the group of unitary rental markets where non-profit rental housing com-
panies operate on the open market influencing crucially the whole rental market. In
theory there should be a tendency in these countries towards phasing out of public
subsidies and regulation (see Kemeny et al. 2005). This seems not to have happened.
Post-socialist welfare states are another group with a rather consistent association
between the welfare state regime and rent regulation. During the socialist years the idea
of housing policy was to attain general and equal accessibility of housing. In practice
this meant strong, though never total or cross-nationally uniform (see Tosics 2012,
Soaita & Dewilde 2019) state control over different aspects of housing policy. Private
renting was usually legal under certain conditions but landlord’s property rights were
extremely limited (Heged€us & Puzanov 2018). After the collapse of communism, the
liberation of housing markets and privatization of rental housing to individual tenants
alongside with tradition of self-provision led to a very high levels of homeownership
and low levels of mortgage debt (Stephens et al. 2015). Some of the housing restituted
to past owners was transformed into private rental housing as sitting tenants were pro-
tected against evictions (Lux et al. 2018) Soaita & Dewilde (2019) point out that the
differences that these countries had in their housing provision during communist era,
are still reflected in the contemporary housing quality. At present, owner-occupation is
the dominating tenure in post-socialist countries and PRS has been a neglected area of
housing policy and this has led to widespread informality of the sector (Heged€us et al.
2018). There are twelve countries classified in this group, and third-generation rent
control is professed in only two of them, Poland and Croatia. In both countries, as well
as in all but one of these countries, PRS is quite insignificant.
In all the countries5 classified in the liberal welfare regime we would also expect to
find a free PRM. This does not seem to be so, as two of these countries, Ireland and
Scotland, practice rent regulation, some introduced quite recently. In Ireland, there is
a very mild second-generation rent control system targeted at private rental housing.
However, Ireland has placed new restrictions on PRM lately, as a time-bound (up to
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3 years) system of rent pressure zones restricting rent increases was introduced in
December 2016 (see Government of Ireland 2016). Lately, also Scotland has intro-
duced a mild third-generation type of rent regulation system that Robertson and
Young (2018) call ‘almost free market approach to rent regulation’. In this system,
rent increases are only permitted annually and tenants can challenge rent increases
by referring the rent rise demand to a Rent Officer, who then determines the going
market rent. In addition, Scotland has introduced rent pressure zones similar to
Ireland (ibid.; Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016). Due to new legisla-
tion, Scotland is classified as having third-generation rent control. However, this clas-
sification is debateable since the requirements for rent regulation or rent pressure
zones are set very high for them to actually take effect.
Most of the countries classified as belonging to the South European welfare regime
also have a free market in PRM. However, Spain and Cyprus have a somewhat differ-
ent form of third-generation rent control. In Spain, rent increases in all rental hous-
ing are controlled for the first 3 to 5 years, whereas in Cyprus, regulation of rent
increase concerns only statutory housing. According to Allen (2006) the development
of housing systems in South European countries differs from the northern Europe.
After Second World War there was much less damage to the housing stock and most
of the population was still living in rural areas. There was no need to develop exten-
sive social rented sectors thus housing policies mainly supported owner occupation.
The extended family was an important provider of cash and other resources for newly
forming households.
The group of countries classified as social democratic welfare states might be
thought to favour the regulation of PRM. In three of the five countries, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, some form of regulation is, in fact, professed. In two of the
countries, Finland and Iceland, there is a free market in PRM. We will look more
closely at these countries in the next section since they represent an interesting mix
of state involvement in the private rental sector. The discussion concerning them will
add some (more) complexity to the issue of rent regulation.
To conclude our first two questions, there still is rent regulation in Europe and
there are even countries that have lately taken measures to strengthen rent regulation.
Apart Ireland and Scotland, also Germany introduced a ‘rental brake’ for new lettings
in areas of high demand in 2015 (Deschermeier et al. 2016). All these legislations are
targeted to areas of high demand where market rents are expected to increase exces-
sively. This could also be an attempt to update rent regulation to tackle present day
rental housing market problems. Looking at the different approaches taken by differ-
ent European countries concerning PRM, we come back to the question, why some
countries preserve or even return to rent regulation while others abolish the system.
It seems that a country’s belonging to a specific welfare regime will not provide an
answer to this.
Housing Regimes and Rent Regulation - the Nordic Countries
Our focus on the persistence and forms of regulation of rents is interesting in a sense
that deregulation and market solutions are a major trend in many countries in
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Europe but it is deliberately narrow (as we are not looking at other aspects of the
rental housing relation, like security of tenure). However, a deeper look at our topic
would need a more case-based approach and contextualization. Tenure forms are not
independent of each other. They are alternative institutional arrangements through
which consumers gain possession of housing. They form a system in the sense that
developments concerning one tenure form may have repercussions for others. For
example, increasing supply of social rental housing may push rents lower in the
PRM, or, substantial strengthening of security of tenure in renting may diminish peo-
ple’s interest in becoming owner-occupiers. Therefore, the significance of rent regula-
tion as a policy is dependent on the institutional system of possession of housing, a
significant part of the country’s housing regime.
The concept of ‘housing regime’ is often used in comparative housing research -
but without consensus on how it should be defined (see e.g. Kemeny 2006, Dewilde
& De Decker 2016, Clapham 2019). By ‘housing regime’ we refer to the set of funda-
mental principles according to which housing provision is operating in some defined
area, municipality, region, state (Ruonavaara, forthcoming). Such principles are
thought to be embodied in the institutional arrangements concerning housing provi-
sion, in political interventions in housing issues, as well as in discourses through
which housing issues are customarily comprehended.
In welfare regime typologies, the Nordic countries represent the same social demo-
cratic welfare state regime creating an expectation that also their housing regimes
would be quite similar. Lujanen singles out the following similarities: Nordic coun-
tries ‘seek to provide housing of a decent standard for the whole of their population’,
there is a division of labour between the state and municipalities in housing policy
and the private sector builds housing and ‘is responsible for the areas where this sec-
tor functions effectively’ (Lujanen 2004, p. 15). These similarities are, however, quite
general and it is doubtful whether they single out Nordic housing regimes from most
others in welfare capitalist societies. A good case can be made that in Nordic coun-
tries there are larger differences between housing regimes than welfare state regimes
(see Bengtsson et al 2013).
We agree with Clapham that ‘[e]very housing regime is unique’ (Clapham 2019, p.
39) – but for analytical purposes they need to be classified into types. Here we use
the typology by Bengtsson et al (2013) in their study of Nordic housing policies. The
book contains formulations of the core characteristics of the post-war housing sys-
tems in five Nordic countries. However, when comparing the housing regimes, the
different characteristics are reduced to two dimensions, the orientation of housing
policy and its institutional basis. The first dimension refers to whether the policy is
universal (general), targeted to all households, or selective, targeted to those who
need support the most. The latter refers to what housing tenures the policy uses as
Table 3. Nordic housing regimes at their high point.
The institutional basis of policy
Owner-occupation Owner-occupation and renting Renting
Policy orientation Universal Norway Sweden Denmark
Selective Iceland Finland
Source: Bengtsson 2013, p. 404.
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its main instrument. We start from this typology and then bring in other features of
the national housing regimes.
Table 3 shows the Nordic countries according to the type of housing regime they
have. Note that this table is a description of housing regimes at their ‘high point’,
sometimes around 1980. Changes have happened as the housing regimes built to
maturity in the post-war period are challenged by a trend towards marketization and
housing policy retrenchment.
Danish, Swedish and Norwegian housing policies have been described as ‘universal’
in the sense that they are directed towards all types of households and all segments
of the housing market. Finnish and Icelandic housing policies have been labelled as
‘selective’, meaning that they are directed more directly towards households of lesser
means based on individual means-testing (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara 2010). Also, the
role of different tenures varies between Nordic countries. In Denmark, the main
instrument for housing provision has been rental housing in the so-called third sector
that consists of housing associations that are self-governing units (Nielsen 2010). In
Finland, housing policy has in the past operated through both renting and homeown-
ership, as state subsidies have been targeted for both tenures. More recently, the focus
has shifted to social rental housing in line with the Finnish housing policy’s selective
orientation. Housing policy has mainly been understood as social policy aiming to
provide housing for those who cannot acquire it in the market. In Iceland, the orien-
tation of the country’s selective housing policy has been towards self-build home
ownership. In Norway, housing policy has been institutionally based on individual
and cooperative ownership. The social rental sector represents only a marginal per-
centage, and the role of private renting has historically been restricted. In Sweden,
the municipal rental housing sector has been the central housing policy instrument.


















Finland Freedom of contract As agreed in
the contract
Free markets 16





















Source: TENLAW national reports: http://www.tenlaw.uni-bremen.de (accessed 30 March 2017); Bengtsson et al.
2013; The Ministry of Welfare in Iceland 1994; EU-SILC survey 2015.
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However, the long-term policy objective of the Swedish housing policy has been ten-
ure neutrality in the distribution of state subsidies (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara 2010;
Ruonavaara 2012; see also Bengtsson et al. 2013).
Rent regulation in the Nordic countries
Table 4 summarizes the present rent regulation policies in the Nordic countries.
The two countries with a selective housing policy, Finland and Iceland, are the
only ones with a free market in PRM. Finland has a long history of rent regulation.
During the first years of independence (1917-1921), several short-term rent control
acts were introduced, but the tenancy law of 1925 had no rent control. During the
Second World War, rent control measures were again introduced and they continued
after the war due to a serious housing shortage (Juntto 1990). Rent controls were
gradually eliminated by 1961 but reintroduced again in 1968. This system was found
too rigid and was replaced with a second-generation rent regulation that lasted until
the 1990s. The private rental market was gradually deregulated in a five-year period
from 1991 to 1995 (Kettunen & Ruonavaara 2015; Kettunen 2018; Ruonavaara 2013).
The story of rent regulation in Iceland is somewhat different. Like elsewhere, also in
the early 20th century Iceland most dwellings in urban centres were rented. A housing
crisis in Reykjavik in 1917 led to introducing a rent control policy which was
opposed by landlords and abolished in 1926. Rent control was introduced again dur-
ing the Second World War and abolished in 1953 where after rental markets have
been unregulated. However, the post-war housing policy was characterized by heavy
promotion of self-built, privately owned family houses. By 1960 already 70 percent of
housing was owner-occupied, and the rising trend continued until the 1990s making
Iceland one of the foremost ‘nations of homeowners’ in Europe. The particularly
strong emphasis on home ownership led to the marginalization of the PRS.
(Sveinsson 2000, Sveinsson 2013.)
Ruonavaara (2012) notes that one thing in common with the Nordic countries has
been a certain policy bias against private renting. The housing policy regimes that
developed in the Nordic countries after the Second World War tended to treat private
renting as speculative activity that needed control and regulation for the protection of
tenants. According to Sveinsson, ‘the main force behind the growth of homeowner-
ship in Iceland – – was not so much the ‘pull’ of homeownerships as it was the ‘push’
away from the early twentieth century dominant tenure, private landlordism’
(Sveinsson 2000, p. 83). He adds that in a country like Iceland the escape from pri-
vate renting was channelled to home ownership whereas in other countries non-profit
rental housing was the solution.
In the Finnish housing regime, the route of ‘escape’ was provided by subsidizing
the growth of homeownership with production and consumption subsidies but also
by creating a social rental housing sector. That sector grew from modest beginnings
in the post-war years to become as big as the PRS. Rent regulation policies made pri-
vate rental housing an unattractive investment and contributed to the decline of its
share in the housing stock. The expansion of state involvement in housing provision
ended by the end of 1980s and a period of retrenchment started. One of the most
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important signs of the shift towards retrenchment was the deregulation of PRM
(Ruonavaara 2013).
Norway is a country that has for a long time had a universal orientation in hous-
ing policy and an emphasis on homeownership. The clearest and probably most fam-
ous example of the Nordic suspicion of PRM is the Norwegian social democratic
leader Trygve Bratteli’s statement in the parliament in 1951 that he cannot accept
‘owning other people’s homes as a field of private enterprise’ (cited in Annaniassen
2013, p. 220; our translation). According to Torgersen, the housing policy priority in
post-World War II Norway ‘was to organize the exodus from the Egypt of private
tenancy’ to the Promised Land of homeownership (Torgersen 1987, p. 123). Norway
has been and still is a ‘social democratic home-owning society’ (Annaniassen 2013)
with a housing policy focussed on advancing ownership of housing, both in the form
of homeownership and co-operative tenure (see e.g. Stamsø 2014 and Sandlie &
Gulbrandsen 2017). In contrast to Denmark, Finland and Sweden the public rental
housing sector has been quite unimportant in Norway.
As many other countries in Europe also Norway introduced a first-generation rent
control during the First World War. This system made way to milder second-gener-
ation rent control that lasted until 1935. After the Second World War rent control
was again reinstated. Also, the evictions were made difficult, and the conversion of
rental flats to owner-occupied homes was restricted. In the Norwegian system the
regulation was enforced through local rent boards that landlords were supposed to
involve in determining the rent of new dwellings. Whether decided jointly with the
rent boards or independently the rent levels were to comply with the rent regulation
rules – otherwise the tenant had the right to demanding lowering of the rent. In 1982
this system was abandoned, though regulations were left in force in dwellings built
before the Second World War. The current rent regulation system is quite mild. The
rent act of 1999 introduced a legislation that allowed market rents for new tenancies.
Rent increases can be made once a year based on consumer price index. A larger
revision is permitted every third year. The typical length for a fixed-term rental con-
tract is three years in Norway. (Oust 2018). Though this system is quite close to
unregulated market, we have categorized the Norwegian rent act as representing a
very mild third-generation rent control since there is a limitation on rent increases,
albeit the increases follow general price trends and the adjustments every third year
secure market rents. Still, the limitations to rent increases reflect the state’s involve-
ment in the PRM.
In Norway the established housing regime with a traditionally universal orientation
has not kept rent regulation strong in the housing system. But that regime is in tran-
sition due to the state retrenchment in housing policy. In recent times Norway has
been moving towards a selective model of housing policy (Bengtsson et al 2013).
Moreover, the Norwegian housing policy – irrespective the government in power –
has been based more on homeownership and co-operative tenure than renting. The
deregulation of prices in co-operative housing has been considered a more important
milestone in housing policy than that of PRM (see e.g. Annaniassen 2013;
Sørvoll 2013).
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Denmark and Sweden are the two Nordic countries with a universal housing pol-
icy and second-generation rent control. In Denmark, there exists four different rent
regulation systems simultaneously, but, in general, all types of rented dwellings are
subject to rent regulation. The primary type of regulation is cost-based rent. In other
regulation systems, the rent is determined either through comparison with other ten-
ancies or based on the value of the premises (i.e. determined through comparison
with other similar tenancies in the same area) (TENLAW National report for
Denmark 2017). However, in new dwellings built after 1991, there may be deviations
from rent regulation. Also, municipalities have some latitude concerning the applica-
tion of rent regulation, and a total of about 130 municipalities (out of 275) have no
rent regulation for the PRM. It is estimated that non-rent regulated letting accounts
for about ten percent of the Danish rental market (Skak & Bloze 2013). Rent
increases can be made when the running costs of the apartment exceed the existing
rent, when improvements have been made or when the value of the premises signifi-
cantly exceeds the existing rent. Landlords and tenants can also agree on a stepwise
rent increase. When rent regulation is not applied, rent increases may be based on a
net retail price index or may be stepwise rent increases (TENLAW National report
for Denmark 2017).
In Sweden, the rent regulations introduced during the Second World War were
gradually replaced by the current rent negotiation system, between 1969 and 1978
(Andersson & S€oderberg 2012). Sweden has its own unique system for setting rents
and rent increases. Owner-occupied housing can be rented out freely, but this applies
mostly to detached and row houses. Most of the rental housing consists of blocks of
flats, and they are owned by municipal housing companies or private rental compa-
nies. Rents in these flats are bargained between tenants’ and landlords’ associations
(Bengs 2015). Previously, private rents were tightly connected to public rents, but this
connection has now been discarded. Regardless, private sector rents still must be
shown to be comparable to those apartments of similar use-value (Christophers
2013). When setting rent for an apartment, other apartments with a similar utility
value must be found. The rent is set based on the highest rents of the comparable
apartments. If there is no comparative material, the rent tribunal will assess the rent
(TENLAW national report for Sweden 2017). All rent increases are negotiated
between landlord and individual tenants or between landlords and the Swedish
Union of Tenants (f the landlord has a principal bargaining agreement with the
Union and the tenants have a bargaining clause in their tenancy agreements). If there
is no agreement between the landlord and the union (or the tenants), an application
to the rent tribunal must be made (TENLAW national report for Sweden 2017).
Usually Sweden’s rent negotiation system is classified as rent regulation—as is
done here—but there are dissenting views about this. This system is sometimes called
indirect rent control because rents are controlled through negotiations, rather than
through an explicit direct form of rent control (Andersson & S€oderberg 2012).
Whether rents are regulated in Sweden or not is also partly a political issue. On one
hand, those who generally favour deregulation are prone to consider the Swedish sys-
tem as regulated, and this view is shared by many economists. Those who think that
regulation of the housing market is good often do not consider the Swedish system
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as rent regulation. If the Swedish system is neither a rent regulation system nor a free
market system, what is it?
According to Bengtsson (2016, p. 23-24), the Swedish system is a third type of
rent setting system between regulation and free market. It is not rent regulation, as it
is not based on public control but on bargaining between the landlord and tenant
organizations. These negotiations are based on the assessment of the use value of the
dwelling, and the qualities of housing according to which the assessment of the use
value is made are such that they would have value in the market also. So, the negoti-
ated rents are meant to reflect the potential market rent of the dwelling. Still,
Andersson and S€oderberg (2012) call the outcome of these rent negotiations
‘surprisingly uniform’ and Bengs (2015) criticizes the centralized bargaining system
for preventing rental markets from operating as open markets normally do.
Based on the brief survey of rent regulation in Nordic countries, can we say that
there is a link between housing regime and rent regulation policy? The selective
orientation in housing policy implies that most households are expected to provide
housing for themselves by self-provision or through the private market – and public
support is a special policy for those in greatest need. So, in such a regime the idea
that the state should not interfere in the workings of the housing market seems quite
natural. However, in Finland especially, rent regulation has in the past been rather
persistent and its final abolishment is a part of the state retrenchment in housing pol-
icy. This may have to do with the fact that also ‘type of housing regime’ is an ideal
construct that simplifies the complexities of real cases. Selective systems can have uni-
versal elements and vice versa – and at times there might be attempts to change the
policy orientation. Especially the cases of Denmark and Sweden, perhaps also that of
Norway, seem to indicate that universalism in housing policy may coincide with per-
sistence of rent regulation – despite the pressure towards retrenchment that affect all
the Nordic countries. According to Christophers (2013), Sweden, the past model of
universalist housing policy, has become a ‘monstrous hybrid’ where subsidies to hous-
ing provision have been cut down but rental market has not been deregulated.
Conclusion
Though it is quite true to say that the European housing systems have largely moved
towards deregulation and neoliberalization, and that a close majority of countries
have a free market in PRM, the policy of rent regulation has by no means disap-
peared from the scene. Sixteen of our 33 countries practiced second- or third-gener-
ation rent control, sometimes limited to particular parts of the housing stock. The
example of rent regulation seems to indicate that the European housing provision
systems are far from completely neoliberalized, and many systems could perhaps be
considered as hybrid. However, our analysis shows that the generation of rent control
approach has its limitation in classification of present day rent regulation systems.
The range of second-generation rent control measures is very wide and the difference
between second- and third-generation rent control is not always clear cut. In add-
ition, new regulations in areas of high demand challenge old perceptions of rent
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regulation. The development of more nuanced classification could diversify compara-
tive analysis in the future.
Belonging to a specific welfare regime type might be thought to predict whether
rents are regulated or not. There is some convergence between countries in the same
regime type, but there are also differences. Just like in some other aspects of housing
(see Hoekstra 2005; Schwartz & Seabrooke 2008; Griggs & Kemp 2012) the regime
typology does not seem to be the master key to explaining rent regulation policies. In
order to take the analysis one step further, we took a closer look at the Nordic coun-
tries employing a typology of housing regimes. Nordic countries all belong to the
Scandinavian welfare regime, but their housing regimes differ. To make comparison
easier, a two-dimensional typology of housing regimes was constructed based on
whether the policy is universal or selective and whether it uses as its institutional
base renting or owner-occupation (or both). Only the policy orientation dimension
seemed to be associated with regulation of rents. The concise case descriptions on the
histories of rent regulation in the Nordic countries suggest that analysis on the level
of types of housing regime need to be completed with more detailed studies of how
national housing regimes have evolved taking into account contextual factors affecting
social relations of private renting. This paper is a modest contribution to a compara-
tive study of social relations of housing in the private rental sector. Regulation of pri-
vate renting is, of course, more than just regulation of rents: it is also regulation of
other aspects of the relationship between tenant and landlord, such as security of ten-
ure (Haffner et al. 2018, Whitehead et al. 2012) or other nonprice regulation, e.g. let-
ting agency regulation, registration of landlords, tenancy deposit schemes. The
country reports of TENLAW project provide a rich material of the legal construction
of private rental tenure in Europe. However, the legal framework is not the only
aspect to be considered. Among other things, the position of private rental housing
in housing provision as well as the degree to which the landlord and tenant interests
are organized and represented politically have to do with how the landlord-tenant
relation comes to be constructed in the PRS. We see comparative case studies as the
most promising way of investigating the issue.
Our analysis focuses on reviewing regulation policies. A further perspective on ren-
tal housing regulation would be to focus on housing outcomes. What are the conse-
quences of the chosen regulation policy in terms of supply, housing quality and rent
levels? A good regulation policy should guarantee that enough rental housing is pro-
vided for consumers, it is of good quality and affordable. An analysis with the focus
on outcomes would require measures of supply, quality and affordability. A difficulty
of such analysis would be that housing outcomes are not only a result of policies but
also of the whole structure of social relations of housing as well as situational factors.
The context-dependence makes it so that there is not necessarily one right policy that
would guarantee the best outcomes.
Notes
1. We prefer the term ‘regulation of rents’ over the term ‘rent control’ as a general concept
referring to policies attempting to regulate the level of rents partly because in our national
context the latter term refers to quite strict administrative control of rents with little
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concern for the return to the investment that the landlord might get. However, we are not
entirely consistent with this usage as we will use the established terminology of
‘generations of rent control’ to refer to different forms that regulation of rents may take.
2. The power differential between landlord and tenant in an unregulated market is also the
foundation of Tyler Zimmer’s philosophical defense of rent regulation (see Zimmer 2017).
Zimmer argues that tenants are relationally vulnerable in the landlord-tenant relationship.
For example, the landlord can afford to walk away from a negotiation with a prospective
tenant whereas the tenant cannot do this. Zimmer sees regulation of rents as one tool for
balancing this power differential.
3. In the Appendix to the article there is a table where the division of tenures and types of
rent regulation were cross-tabulated for our 33 countries. An earlier version of this paper
included a section where we discussed whether there are some associations between tenure
structures and rent regulation policies. About the only association there seemed to be was
that countries with strict rent regulation systems tended to have high rental housing rates.
In this version of the paper this analysis is left out as it is a distraction from the general
theme of regimes/rent regulation. However, the appended table is needed as a reference
on the size of PRS.
4. Source EU SILC 2015
5. Our data separates England and Scotland that so far are part of one state, the United
Kingdom. Our data does not cover Wales or Northern Ireland.
6. This category may include co-operative sector and other intermediate tenures as well as
unknown tenure
7. In Sweden, co-operative apartments are counted as home ownership. Also, no distinction
between private and public/social renting is made in legislation in Sweden. However,
about half of the rental sector is owned by municipal housing companies.
8. In Norway, no distinction is made between private and public/social renting in legislation.
However, larger municipalities own a substantial proportion of rental dwellings.
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Appendix 1. Tenure structure in relation to type of rent control
Second generation rent control
Home ownership Private rental Public/Social rental Other6
Austria 50% 16,3% 24% 9,7%
Denmark 44% 24% 25% 7%
France 58% 23% 19% –
Ireland 69,7% 18,5% 10,3% 1,5%
The Netherlands 59% 8% 34% –
Sweden7 54% 41% N/A 5%
Third generation rent control
Home ownership Private rental Public/Social rental Other
Belgium 66% 23% 9% –
Croatia 89,4% 2,9% 1,8% 5,7%
Cyprus 68,6% 18,8% N/A 12,4%
Germany 42,4% 48% 4% 5%
Luxemburg 69% 27,7% 0,6% 2,7%
Norway8 62,8% 22,8% N/A 14,4%
Poland 62,6% 4% 8% 25,4%
Scotland 60,7% 11,6% 23,8% 3,9%
Spain 82,2% 10,1% 2% 5,7%
Switzerland 36,8% 52% 3,8% 6,2%
Free markets
Home ownership Private rental Public/Social Rental Other
Bulgaria 87,2% 1,7% 11,1% –
Czech Republic 55,9% 17,6% N/A 26,5%
England 64% 18% 18% –
Estonia 82% 7,3% 1,7% 9%
Finland 67% 16% 14% 3%
Greece 71,7% 19,8% N/A 8,3%
Hungary 88% 8% 3% 1%
Iceland 77,8% 11,1% 11,1% –
Italy 67,2% 16,3% 5,5% 11%
Latvia 84,9% 14,7% 0,4% –
Lithuania 88% 9% 3% –
Malta 75,2% 14,6% 6% 4,2%
Portugal 73% 18% 2% 7%
Romania 93,2% 4,2% 2,5% –
Serbia 87,5% 5% 1,7% 5,7%
Slovakia 84,9% 2,6% 2,1% 6,1%
Slovenia 77% 3% 6% 14%
Source: TENLAW National Reports; source for Iceland EU SILC 2015.
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